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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-DURATION OF STATUS OF "DRIVER" FOR 
PURPOSES OF GUEST STATUTE-Plaintiffs were guests riding in defendant's 
automobile. Defendant stepped out of the vehicle leaving the motor run-
ning, the hand brake unset, and the automatic shift in neutral position. 
A departing passenger brushed against the gear lever and started the vehicle 
which struck a wall causing injuries to the plaintiffs. On appeal from 
judgment adverse to the plaintiffs, held, reversed. Defendant may be held 
liable for ordinary negligence. California's "guest" statute! limiting guests 
l Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering, 1948) §403. 
142 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
to recovery for injuries sustained by the driver's willful misconduct does 
not apply in this case, since the defendant ceased to be a driver the moment 
he stepped out of the vehicle. Panopulos v. Maderis, (Cal. App. 1956) 293 
P. (2d) 121. 
Absent a controlling statute, the driver of a vehicle has a duty to 
exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuries to his guests.2 The 
perils of modem highway driving, and claims that frequent collusion of 
driver and guest in actions against the driver's insurer had caused insurance 
rates to rise,3 led to the adoption of statutes in twenty-six states limiting 
the driver's liability.4 These statutes, generally considered constitutional,:! 
limit recovery by a guest to certain types of conduct, such as willful mis-
conduct or gross negligence on the part of specified individuals.6 Whether 
the defendant is a "driver" within the scope of a guest statute is dealt with 
for the first time in the principal case. Prior cases considered extensively 
the scope to be given the term "guest,"7 but had not passed on the defini-
tion of "driver" or "operator" under these statutes. The statutes commonly 
make the operator or owner liable to guests for gross negligence. Only 
the California statute is limited in scope to the driver of the vehicle.a 
Superficially, it could be argued that the California legislature must have 
intended to afford limited liability only to those in actual physical control 
of the vehicle, as the principal case holds. Otherwise it certainly could 
have adopted the language of any one of twenty-five other statutes. This 
2Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 120, 103 A. 4 (1918); Dashiell v. Moore, 177 Md. 657, 
11 A. (2d) 640 (1940); Saxby v. Cadigen, 266 Wis. 391, 63 N.W. (2d) 820 (1954). This rule 
compares a guest in a vehicle with a licensee upon realty. A minority view, which allows 
recovery only when the driver has been grossly negligent, analogizes guest to bailor and 
operator to bailee. Passler v. Mowbray, 318 Mass. 231, 61 N.E. (2d) 120 (1945); Slaton v. 
Hall, 172 Ga. 675, 158 S.E. 747 (1931); 65 A.L.R. 952 (1930). 
3 Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (i931). These claims as reasons for 
guest statutes are challenged in White, "The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-
Paying Passenger," 20 VA. L. R.Ev. 326 (1934). 
4 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 36, §95; Ark. Stat. (1947) §75-913; Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering, 
1948) §403; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §13-9-1; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 21, §6101; Fla. 
Stat. (1955) §320.59; Idaho Code (1948) §49-1001; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 95½, §58 (a); Ind. 
Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1952) §47-1021; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §8-122b; Mich. 
Comp. Laws (1948) §256.29; Mont. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1954) §32-1113; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952) 
§39-740; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929; Supp. 1938) §4439; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) 
§64-24-1; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §39-15; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §4515.02; Ore. 
Rev. Stat. (1953) §30.110; S.C. Code (1952) §46-801; S.D. Code (1939) §44.0362; Tex. Civ. 
Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6701b; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §41-9-1; Vt. Stat. (1947) 
§10.223; Va. Code (1950) §8-646.1; Wash. Rev. Code §46.08.080; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
(1945) §60-1201. 
o Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57 (1929); Naudzius v. Lahr, note 3 supra. But 
see Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 P. 998 (1928), which held that a statute denying 
any recovery was unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law. 
6 See 96 A.L.R. 1479 (1935). 
7 See 82 A.L.R. 1365 (1933). 
s There are other "guest" statutes that mention "driver." The Illinois statute includes 
"driver," but also includes owner, operator, employer, and agent. Montana includes the 
driver's intoxication but also includes the gross negligence of an owner or operator within 
its scope. North Dakota and Utah use "driver" along with "owner" and "person respon• 
sible for the operation of the car" in limiting liability to gross negligence. 
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argument, however, rests on questionable grounds. The policy reasons 
behind guest statutes in general should apply here, for there is as great a 
possibility of collusion between insured and guest as in any other highway 
negligence situation. According to the strict definition which this court 
adopts, "operator" as well as "driver" would include only those in actual 
physical control of a vehicle.9 But a long line of cases indicates that 
"operator" as used in other statutes may include an owner who is not the 
person in actual physical control.10 In another context the California 
court has concluded that "the driver of the vehicle," as used in a statute 
requiring a driver to render assistance to a victim of an accident, included 
an owner present in the automobile, but without physical control of the 
vehicle.11 Thus the rule of the principal case, that driver includes only 
those in actual control, would seem to be inconsistent with past decisions, 
and would logically call for further limitations on the concept of "driver." 
The rule might be extended to exclude from the operation of the statute 
drivers who had fallen asleep, or who had been thrown from a vehicle 
before an accident.12 One possible way to avoid this undesirable result 
would be to say that as long as the "ride" continues, all parties, including 
the driver, remain in the same relationship to each other.13 Since a ride 
may be considered to continue as long as there is a "guest" in the vehicle, 
the duration of the ride might in tum be contingent upon_ duration of the 
guest status. As long as the plaintiff remains in the guest status, the guest 
statute would apply, and who is ultimately responsible would be a second-
ary question. 
George Kircos 
9 Cf. Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering, 1948) §§69, 70. Both driver and operator are defined 
as a person "who drives or is in actual physical control of a ... vehicle." 
10 See 13 A.L.R. (2d) 378 (1950). Especially interesting in this connection is Sutton 
v. Tanger, 115 Cal. App. 267, 1 P. (2d) 521 (1931). 
11 People v. Odom, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 641, 66 P. (2d) 206 (1937). 
12 Cf. 138 A.L.R. 1388 (1942). 
13 In Puckett v. Pailthorpe, 207 Iowa 613, 223 N.W. 254 (1929), the court said at p. 
618 that the plaintiff was not a guest within the statute "because no driver was operating 
the machine." However, the court stated that if the injury had taken place after the trip 
had started, but the group had stopped for snacks during which time the accident occurred, 
the results might have been different. In Frankenstein v. House, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 813, 
107 P. (2d) 624 (1940), a driver left an unattended car upon a hill. The car rolled down 
the hill and injured a passenger who had been riding in the car. The court did not discuss 
the status of the driver at all but said at page 816: "As long as a person, without com-
pensation to the driver, has entered a car upon the invitation of such driver and remains 
'in the vehicle upon the highway', 'during such ride' (sec. 403) he is a guest and cannot 
recover damages for the simple negligence of the host." 
